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This paper aims (1) to examine the extent of financial ratio information 
communicated in the annual reports of Malaysian listed companies; (2) to 
examine the significant predictors influencing the extent of financial ratio 
communicated in the annual reports of Malaysian listed companies. The 
sample of study is companies selected from Top 100 companies on Bursa 
Malaysia for year 2011. The annual reports were gathered and the data 
were hand collected. A regression model measured the Extent Financial 
Ratio Disclosure (EF RD) using 10 mostly referred and cited financial ratios. 
Findings reveal that on average, the sample firms disclose 18.4% of 
selected financial ratios in their annual reports. For the corporate 
governance score (CGS), almost half of the members of the board of 
directors are independent. The average percentage of shareholding of 
80.63% and implies that Malaysian shareholding is considered to be 
concentrated. 95% of the sample firms are profit-making firms and 94% of 
them were audited by BIG4 audit firms. The Net Asset Per Share (NAPS) 
ratio is among the popular ratios presented in the annual reports, where 
73% of the sample firms provided this ratio. Return on equity (ROE) 
indicates the profit a company generates with the money shareholders 
have invested show a 33% disclosure level. Corporate Governance (CG) 
does have a positive relationship with EFRD. Higher numbers of 
independent directors increase the extent of the financial ratio disclosures. 
It explains that the role of independent directors as proposed in the MCCG 
actually works and it helps to add value to the quality of financial reporting. 
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Financial ratio disclosures are critically important for several reasons. First, the 
disclosures could serve as the crucial information for users of financial statements, 
including sophisticated or non-sophisticated users. Sophisticated users (management, 
board of directors, investors, shareholders, stakeholders) are reliant on disclosed financial 
ratios to assess the performance of companies. Therefore, providing a comprehensive 
set of financial ratios and how each was defined are crucial sources of information. For 
non-sophisticated users (laymen), the financial ratio disclosures will enable them to make 
an informed investment decision making. In addition, many ratios computed today are not 
standard. The lacks of uniformity limits the comparability in financial statements analysis 
and encourage companies to disclose the most favourable ratios to their firm's condition 
(Gibson and Boyer, 1980). Gibson (1982, p18) viewed that "probably no tool is more 
effective in evaluating the financial future of a company than the proper use of financial 
ratios". Thus, the financial ratio disclosures are essential to overcome these problems. 
Despite their wide use and stated importance, there typically is a paucity of financial ratio 
information disclosed in company's annual reports. In recent years, there has been 
increasing interest in financial ratio disclosures. Gibson (1982) provides a list and 
description of ratios that are frequently used in annual reports. Watson, Shrives and 
Marston (2002) investigate the relationship between financial ratio disclosures and firm 
characteristics in W.K, while Australian companies were studied by Mitchell (2006) on their 
selectivity of reporting. In Malaysia, Abdullah and Ku lsmail (2008) investigated the 
association between accounting ratios and performance of the firms. They found low level 
of disclosure on financial ratios among the Malaysian companies. Ho, Aripin and Tower 
(2012) analyzed the impact of corporate governance mechanisms and firm characteristics 
on financial ratios disclosure over the turbulent 2001 and 2006 periods in Malaysia. They 
found the highest category of financial ratio disclosures is profitability. None of corporate 
governance mechanisms are significantly influenced such disclosure. To date there has 
been little agreement on what should be disclosed due to the voluntary nature of financial 
ratio disclosures (with the notable exception of EPS). This highlights the requirement to 
understand how and why financial ratio information disclosures are made by firm 
management and the board of directors. 
This is where the communication of financial ratios in the annual report comes into the 
picture. Financial ratios are among financial statement analysis tool that are widely used in 
communicating financial performance of the firms. For the purpose of this study, a 
financial ratio is defined as a mathematical relation between two quantities (Subramanyam 
and Wild, 2009). The communication of financial ratios is measured as pre-defined ratios 
provided or reported by companies in their annual reports. This study embarks on two 
objectives that are to examine the extent of financial ratio information communicated in 
the annual reports of Malaysian listed companies, and to examine the significant 
predictors influencing the extent of financial ratio communicated in the annual reports of 
lblalaysian listed companies. 
2. Literature Review 
'This section provides insights on the literature of management disclosure incentive using 
the agency theory. Further, the discussion on the advantages of disclosure within the 
annual report is offered. Then, hypotheses development is discussed. 
Agency Theory 
This research employs agency theory to assist in determining suitable factors that could 
influence voluntary financial ratio disclosures patterns. Agency theory is concerned with 
the relationship between the principal (owner) and agent (manager) of the firm. The 
underlying basis of agency theory is that one party (the principal) assigns work to another 
(the agent) who performs that work. According to Jensen and Meckling (1976, p.308), 
agency relationship is defined as "a contract under which one or more persons (the 
principalls) engage another person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf 
which involves delegating some decision making authority to the agent". 
They also explain that agency theory enhances understanding of the situation where 
separate ownership and control between owner and top management of the firm occurs. 
They also suggest that these parties have their own concerns and preferences giving rise 
to what is known as a 'conflict of interest'. A conflict of interest arises from divergent goals 
between the principal and agent, and difficulties in monitoring agents' actions (Eisenhardt, 
1 989). 
According to Fama and Jensen (1983), a considerably high cost is needed to mor~itor the 
actions and decisions made by an agent. This is because full monitoring of an agent's 
actions seems ur~likely in any principal-agent contract especially for large firms in 
developed industrial societies (Scott, 1997). The agency costs may include a component 
of expenditures incurred by the principal to monitor the agent, the agent's cost on bonding, 
and the residual loss. In addition, Healy and Palepu (2001) suggest the resolution to 
agency problems may require formal contracts, monitoring of management by the board of 
directors, information intermediaries and the market for corporate control. 
Advantages of Disclosure Within The Annual Report 
This section provides insights into the benefits of increased disclosure quantity. It is based 
on the argument that firms should provide sufficient decision-useful information to their 
stakeholders. Knauss (1964, p.607) posits that "disclosure, however, is not a simple 
method of regulation having universal application and universal effectiveness. It assumes 
a different role and meaning depending on the information to be disclosed, and the parties 
for whom the information is intended". 
Botosan (2006) suggests public disclosure mitigates information asymmetry by displacing 
private information and concludes that greater disclosure reduces cost of equity capital. 
Further, Lundholm and Winkle (2006) develop and utilise the same theoretical framework 
in summarising the existing empirical work in the voluntary disclosure area. 
Diamond and Verrecchia (1991) find that disclosure reduces information asymmetry and 
cost of capital. Thus, more disclosure benefits both the firm and its stakeholders. In a 
related study, Healy, Hutton and Palepu (1999) study the relationship between share 
performance and extent of voluntary disclosure. They report that increased disclosure is 
associated with increases in stock performance, growth in institutional ownership, 
increased stock liquidity and higher analyst coverage. 
Lang and Lundholm (1996) found that by disclosing more future information, it reduces 
uncertainty and information asymmetry, improves accuracy of users expectation and it 
also could attract the attention of analysts. In addition, provision of forward looking 
information reduces the cost of capital. Thus, it implies that more disclosure of future- 
orientated information reduces uncertainty of users. 
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Evans and Sridhar (2002) investigate how disclosure may influence capital markets, 
product markets and shareholder litigation. They argue that favourable disclosure lead to 
a lower cost of capital. Graham, Harvey and Rajgopal (2005) list five factors that motivate 
firms to voluntary disclose information. These are information asymmetry, increased 
analyst coverage, corporate control test, stock compensation and management talent. On 
the other hand, they suggest constraints on voluntary disclosure which are litigation risk, 
proprietary costs, political costs and agency cost, and limitation of mandatory disclosure 
precedent that may be hard to maintain. 
To conclude, previous studies have reported ample evidence on the positive impact of 
disclosure to the firms and shareholders. Several studies have applied agency theory in 
explaining the choice of disclosure policy by the firms. It is suggested that voluntary 
disclosure, in addition to mandatory disclosure, reduces the information asymmetry 
problem and therefore enhances better informed decision making. This notion applies to 
voluntary financial ratio disclosures. Despite its obvious benefits and functions, the 
amount of research on voluntary disclosure of financial ratios is still low. Therefore, this 
study explores factors that encourage firms to voluntarily disclosed financial ratios in their 
annual reports. 
Empirical Studies and Hypotheses Development 
-This part provides the theoretical background utilized as a backbone for this research. 
Then, the hypotheses are developed based on past literature. A considerable amount of 
literature has been published on this voluntary financial reporting (Barako, 2004; Eng, 
Hong and Ho, 2001; Botosan, 1997; Meek, Roberts and Gray 1995; Hossain, Tan and 
Adams, 1994; Cooke, 1989; Chow and Wong-Boren, 1987; McNally, Eng and Hasseldine, 
1982). Meek et a/. (1995, p. 555) defines voluntary disclosure as "disclosure in excess of 
requirements - represent free choices on the part of company managements to provide 
accounting and other information deemed relevant to the decision needs of users of their 
annual reports". This section reviews previous studies that examine the association 
between corporate governance, firm size, ownership concentration and extent of financial 
ratio disclosure. 
Corporate Governance 
Corporate governance factors have the potential to minimize agency problems between 
managers and shareholders. There are internal and external governance mechanisms 
designed to reduce agency costs. These mechanisms are essential to moderate the self- 
serving activities of managers. Adoption of governance attributes as recommended by the 
Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance (MCCG) constitute as one of the mechanism 
that helps reduce agency problems arising from the separation of ownership and control 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
In this paper, the strength of corporate governance is measured as the proportion of 
independent directors on the board. As proposed by Bathala and Rao (1995), 
composition of the board is one of several mechanisms than can mitigate agency conflicts 
within the firm, as outlined by agency literature. The argument of agency theory is that 
independent directors are needed on the boards to monitor and control the actions of 
executive directors due to their opportunistic behaviour (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) and 
also to ensure that managers are working in the best interest of the principal (Baysinger 
and Hoskisson, 1990). 
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Palmieri (1979) states that independent directors are critically important because their 
extensive knowledge, experience and they are independent from management, and 
therefore serve an important role to minimise agency problems. As highlighted by John 
and Senbet (1998), board composition is an important element to determine the 
effectiveness of the board. Haniffa and Cooke (2002) argue that an independent board 
serves as an important check and balance mechanism in enhancing boards' 
effectiveness. Support for these assertions is further provided by Fama and Jensen 
(1983), Pettigrew and McNulty (1995) and Eng and Mak (2003) . 
Cheng and Courtenay (2006) found that boards with a larger proportion of independent 
directors are significantly and positively associated with higher levels of voluntary 
disclosure in Singapore. This study also indicates that firms with boards that have a 
niajority of independent directors have higher levels of voluntary disclosure than firms with 
boards that do not have a majority of independent directors. In addition, Chen and Jaggi 
(2000) examined the association between independent directors and corporate disclosure. 
They found a positive relationship between a board with a higher proportion of 
independent directors and comprehensive financial disclosure. These findings are 
consistent with agency theory where higher proportion of independent directors enhances 
voluntary financial reporting (Barako, Hancock and Izan, 2006). 
Further, the effect of good governance practices on the quality of financial reporting has 
recently received attention from researchers (Beasley, Carcello, Hermanson and Lapides, 
2000; Beasley 1996). Beasley (1996) found that no-fraud firms have boards that have a 
significantly higher percentage of outside members than fraud firms. These studies 
demonstrate that the inclusion of outside members on the board reduces the occurrence 
of financial statement fraud, and therefore assists in the provision of reported information 
that faithfully represents the value of financial statement elements. Goodwin and Seow 
(2002) argue that sound governance by board of directors influence the quality of financial 
reporting. 
Computed financial ratios are an effective tool to evaluate firms' operational results 
(Mitchell, 2006) and deemed to be the mirror of firms' performance where higher financial 
ratios generally identify profitable firms (Horrigan, 1965). Misuse of entities' financial 
resources could be highlighted by financial ratios. Thus, the transparency of corporate 
governance elements could minimize poor performance or mitigates fraudulent activity. 
This ultimately will influence the financial ratio disclosure policy, where firms with effective 
governance structure are expected to disclose more financial ratios as publicly available 
information. 
Consistent with this rationale, it is expected that the extent of financial ratio information 
disclosed will be positively related to the strength of corporate governance attributes of the 
firm. The reason for this is that the presence of independent directors makes the release 
of voluntary information less costly because insiders have less to hide (Patelli and 
Prencipe, 2007). This leads to a hypothesis that underlines the link between a firm's 
governance structure and their disclosure of financial ratio information. 'The requirement 
to disclose corporate governance attributes will facilitate a comparison between a firm's 
corporate governance characteristics and financial ratio disclosures. To formally test the 
influence of corporate governance on financial ratio disclosures, the following hypotheses 
are proposed: 
H,: The extent of financial ratio disclosures is positively associated with a stronger 
corporate governance structure. 
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Ownership Structure 
Ownership structure is another mechanism that aligns the interest of shareholders and 
managers (Eng and Mak, 2003; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Chau and Gray, 2002; Hossain 
et a/., 1994). It is believed that agency problems (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) will be 
higher in the widely held companies because of the diverse interests between contracting 
parties (Mohd Ghazali and Weetman, 2006). By utilizing voluntary disclosure, managers 
provide more information to signal that they work in the best interests of shareholders. 
In this study, ownership structure is proxy by ownership concentration. Using agency 
theory tenets, it is argued that firms with higher concentration of ownership structure may 
disclose less information to shareholders through discretionary disclosure. In Australia, 
McKinnon and Dalimunthe (1993) note highly diversified companies disclose more 
voluntary information. In this case, a sample of 65 listed diversified companies was 
studied on their voluntary disclosure of segment information. Hossain et a/. (1994) 
reported a negative association between ownership structure concentration (measured by 
top 10 shareholders) and the level of voluntary disclosure by Malaysian listed firms. Mohd 
Ghazali and Weetman (2006) hypothesised that the companies with higher ownership 
concentration disclose less voluntary information. They found that director ownership is 
significantly associated with the extent of voluntary disclosure. Lakhal (2005) found that 
share ownership concentration is statistically and negatively associated to voluntary 
earnings disclosures. Oliveira et a/. (2006) also documented that firms with a lower 
shareholder concentration voluntarily disclose more information about intangibles in 
Portugal. 
However, Haniffa and Cooke (2002) reported a positive relationship between ownership 
concentration and voluntary disclosures. Craswell and Taylor (1 992) found no relationship 
between ownership structure and the voluntary disclosure of reserves. In research of 
voluntary corporate disclosure by Kenyan companies, Barako (2004) also found no 
relationship. 
Previous literatures clearly evident that information asymmetry between managers and 
shareholders can be mitigated by disclosure strategies (Healy and Palepu, 2001). For this 
particular research, it is expected that ownership structure may influence the voluntary 
disclosure of financial ratio. Therefore, the next hypotheses to be tested are: 
HP: The extent of financial ratio disclosures is negatively associated with higher 
ownership concentration. 
Firm Size 
Firm size is another factor that may potentially influence ,financial ratio disclosure 
practices. A large and growing body of literature has investigated the impact of firm size 
to the disclosure practices of firms (Hossain et al., 1994; Wallace et al., 1994; Chow and 
Wong-Boren, 1987; Buzby, 1975; Singhvi and Desai, 1971). Most of these studies found 
that size does affect the level of financial reporting of companies. 
Further, Watson et a/. (2002) investigate the voluntary disclosure of accounting ratios in 
UK. Their result suggests that large companies are more likely to disclose ratios than 
small companies. Barako et a/. (2006) study the factors influencing voluntary corporate 
disclosure by Kenyan companies and found that size is one of the factors that encourage 
the firm to disclose more information. In another voluntary environmental disclosure study 
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by large UK companies, Brammer and Pavelin (2006) also note that the larger the firm, 
the more likely they will make voluntary disclosures of environmental issues. 
In addition, Singhvi and Desai (1971) outline several reasons for a positive relationship 
between size of company and quality of disclosure. They argued that larger firms tend to 
provide a better quality of disclosure because the lower cost of accumulating detailed 
information. The other reasons are managers of larger company are more likely to realise 
the possible benefits of better disclosure and small corrlpanies are more likely to feel that 
full disclosure of information could endanger their competitive position. It can be 
concluded that firm size does matter to the voluntary financial reporting practices of 
companies. Thus, the impact of firm size is also expected to be in the same direction for 
financial ratio disclosures. Hypotheses designed to test this assertion are formally stated 
as: 
H3: The extent of financial ratio disclosures is positively associated with firm size. 
3. The Methodology and Model 
The companies are selected from Top 100 companies on Bursa Malaysia in 201 1. The 
annual reports were gathered and the data were hand collected. In terms of regression 
model, the dependent variable is Extent Financial Ratio Disclosure (EFRD). EFRD Index 
is the proxy to measure the extensiveness of financial ratios disclosure. This variable 
captures the voluntary disclosure practice of financial ratios in the annual reports. A 
disclosure index comprising list of ratios commorlly discussed by seminal authors is 
developed. Based on Ho, Aripin and Tower (2012), the list is narrowed down to 10 mostly 
referred and cited financial ratios. They are Net Assets Per Share (NAPS), Return On 
Equity (ROE), Return On Assets (ROA), Gearing (GEA), Dividend Payout (DP), Dividend 
Yield (DY), Return On Shareholder (RS), Price to Earnings (PE), Gross Profit Margin 
(GPM) and Debt to Equity (DE). 
Each voluntary ratio will be noted as being disclosed (1) if presented in the annual report 
for each company and (0) otherwise. The EFRD score is computed by summing up all 
items disclosed divided by 10. The EFRD score can be mathematically represented as 
follows: 
EFRDj = total number of financial ratios 
disclosed 
The independent variables tested are corporate governance, ownership concentration and 
firm size. Corporate governance score (CGS) is a measure of the percentage of 
independent directors to total number of directors on the board of directors. Ownership 
Concentration Score (OCS) is the number of shares owned by top thirty shareholders 
divided by the total number of shares issued. Firm Size (SIZE) is measured as the natural 
logarithm of total assets. In order to control for other effects on the dependent variables, 
two control variables are used. These are Profit1 Loss Firm (PLF) and profit firm=l, and 
loss firm=O. Similarly, Big4 audit firm=l, otherwise=O. Data is utilised using SPSS software 
for descriptive, uni-variate and regression. 
4. The findings 
Descriptive Analysis 
Table 1 displays the descriptive statistics for the dependent and independent variables. 
On average, the sample firms disclose 18.4% of the selected financial ratios in their 
annual reports. This Extent of Financial Ratio Disclosure (EFRD) percentage is considered 
moderate as compare to previous studies by Ho, Aripin and Tower (2012). There were 
companies which not provided the selected financial ratios at all. However, the maximum 
percentage of the disclosure is 60% of the selected financial ratios. 
For the corporate governance score (CGS), almost half of the members of the board of 
directors are independent. This is in line with Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance 
recommendation where majority of the directors sit on the boardroom should be 
independence. The maximum proportion of independent directors on the board is 75%, 
which is beyond the recommendation by MCCG. 
Firm size (FSIZE) is measured as natural logarithm of total assets of the sample firms. 
The transformation is done to ensure the distribution of the data is normal. On average, 
the FSIZE is 9.51, with minimum and maximum score of 7.3 and 11.47 respectively. 
Further, the ownership concentration score (OCS) is measured as the percentage of 
shareholding of top 30 shareholders. As reported in Table 1, the minimum percentage of 
top 30 shareholders is 26%, while the maximum percentage is 96%, with average 
percentage of shareholding of 80.63%. This shows that Malaysian shareholding is 
considered as concentrated ownership. 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Dependent and Independent Variables 
Profit or loss firm (PLF) and type of auditor (BIG4) are measured using categorical dummy 
measure. From the analysis, it shows that 95% of the sample firms are profit-making firms 
and 94% of them were audited by BIG4 audit firms. The result is consistent with the 
selected sample firms, which are top 100 firms. These firms normally earned profit and 

















































1 94% 23.9% 
Table 2: Frequency of individual ratio 
Table 2 illustrates the frequency of selected ratios communicated by the firms in their 
annual reports. Based on the table, the net assets per share ratio is among the popular 
ratios presented in the annual reports, where 73% of the sample firms provided this ratio. 
This ratio can be classified as share market measure ratio. This ratio provides indicator 
about the firm's value per share. In order the attract investor or potential investors' 
attention, providing this ratios could be helpful. 
) Debt to equity 
The next most commonly presented financial ratio is return on equity (ROE) where 33 
firms reported this ratio. This is a profitability ratio, where investors can have clues about 
how much profit a company generates with the money shareholders have invested. 
Providing this ratio to investors also potentially would enhance the understanding of 
investors about firms' performance. Further, return on assets (ROA) was communicated 
by 19 companies. This ratio provides an indicator of how profitable a company is relative 
to its total assets. ROA gives an idea as to how efficient the management is at using its 
assets to generate earnings. Similarly, this ratio indicates the profitability of the firms. 
Another category of ratios reported by the sample firms is gearing. 16% of the firms 
provide this ratio in their annual report. Gearing is a measure of a company's financial 
leverage and shows the extent to which its operations are funded by lenders versus 
shareholders. The appropriate level of gearing for a company depends on its sector, as 
well as the degree of leverage employed by its peers. 
1 
The next two ratios communicated by the firms are dividend payout and dividend yield, 
where 14 and 10 firms respectively communicated these ratios. The payout ratio provides 
an idea of how well earnings support the dividend payments. A stable dividend payout 
ratio indicates a solid dividend policy by the company's board of directors. 
1% 
Univariate Analysis 
Table 3: T-test EFRD with profitlloss firms and type of audit firm 
EFRD 
Sig. n Mean 
(%) 
Profit1 loss firms 





Profit firms 1 95 0.183 1 
Based on Table 3 above, there are 95 profits firms, and only five loss firms. The mean 
value for loss firms is 0.2, while for profit a firm is 0.183. However, there is no significant 
difference between profit or loss firms. Based on type of audit firm, comparison is made 
between companies audited by Big4 and Non-Big4 audit firms. The mean value for Non- 
Big 4 is 0.217 and mean for Big4 is 0.182. T-test was conducted but the result failed to 
show any differences between this two categories. 
Table 4: Pearson Correlations 
EFRD= Extent of Financial Ratio Disclosures, CG= Corporate Governance, FSIZE= Firm Size, 
OC= Ownership Concentration, PLF=Profit or Loss Firm,  BIG^= Big For Audit Firms. 
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed),* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2- 
tailed). 
Down-left= Pearson. 
With reference to Table 4 above, there is a correlation between EFRD with CG, and CG 
and OC. EFRD and CG is significant at 99% with the value of correlation is 0.265. It 
indicates that with more CG variable, higher EFRD is disclosed. While CG and OC is 
significant at 95% level with the value of -0.218. This means that higher ownership 
concentration is related with lower level of corporate governance. 
Multiple Regression Analysis 
Table 5: Multiple Regressions 
---- 
. EFRD 
Adjusted R~ 0.074 
Observations 100 
F statistics 2.587 
p-value Variables I Coefficients ( t-stat 
I BIG4 -.058 -1.038 0.302 I 
EFRD= Extent of Financial Ratio Disclosures, CG= Corporate Governance, FSIZE= Firm Size, OC= 
Ownership Concentration, PLF=Profit or Loss Firm, BIG4= Big For Audit Firms. 
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed), * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
Based on the analysis, Table 5 reveals that CG variable does have a positive relationship 
with EFRD with the coefficient of 0.328 (p value = 0.01). This explains that higher number 
of independent directors increase the extent of the financial ratio disclosures. It explains 
that the role of independent directors as proposed in the MCCG actually works and it 
helps to add value to the quality of financial reporting. Thus, this finding is also consistent 
with previous studies (Cheng and Courtenay, 2006; Chen and Jaggi, 2000; Barako et a/., 
2006). However, this study does not support the hypotheses 2 and 3. Ownership structure 
and firm size do not influence the disclosure of financial ratios. 
5. Summary and Conclusions 
In summary, annual reports and financial ratios do play a significant role in conveying the 
financial information to the users in making wise decision. Sometimes, users do not 
realize that the important details in the annual reports are sometimes hidden between the 
lines, and users are suggested to know how to read between the lines to get accurate 
information. This is where the communication of financial ratios in the annual report 
comes into the picture. 
Financial ratios are one of the financial statement analysis tools that are widely used in 
communicating financial performance of the firms. Potential reason why companies 
provide this information is to portray in a simple way about their performance. This is 
helpful for unsophisticated readers of annual reports. Further, by communicating financial 
ratios freely in the annual reports, potentially it will avoid additional cost being imposed to 
the users in order to get information about the firm. The information also is more reliable 
since it is provided in the company's official annual reports, as compared to third party 
financial information provider. Interestingly, this study found that higher number of 
independent directors has enhanced the extent of the financial ratio disclosures. This 
indicates that the roles of independent directors as proposed in the MCCG is meaningful 
and add value to the quality of financial reporting in Malaysian companies. 
In terms of the limitation, this study only considers ten (10) elements in the extent of 
financial ratio disclosures. More elements such as done by previous studies must be 
tested as the sample of country is different. Moreover, this study only consider one year 
(201 1) as the period of study. In future, possibly a trend analysis may give more 
meaningful results. Besides CG indicator, other aspects such as duality leadership, board 
size and board quality may be considered for future study. Also future research may 
consider Government-Linked Companies and Family Companies as a sample set. 
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